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AMY M. MASON 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, developing countries have expressed increasing 
frustration with their status in the international trade regime. The 
Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations 
notoriously collapsed in September 2003 amidst developing-country 
dissatisfaction with proposed access to developed-country markets.1 
So, too, developing countries have criticized WTO rulings allowing 
developed countries to impose import restrictions based on 
environmental considerations.2 Most recently, India challenged the 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Amy M. Mason. 
 1. Stephen J. Glain, For Poor Nations, a Pyrrhic Victory—Economists Say Show of 
Strength at WTO Summit Will Hurt in End, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2003, at Fl. The WTO 
does not define “developing” or “developed country,” and countries may choose to define 
themselves as one or the other. WTO, Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). However, international law commentators broadly define 
“developed countries” as the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1338 (1996). “Developing” countries are, 
by default, all countries not part of the group of “developed” countries. E.g., Andrew Guzman 
& Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement 
at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S205 app. C at S235 (2002). In contrast, 
“least-developed countries” are explicitly recognized as such by the United Nations. WTO, 
Least-Developed Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 2. See Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or 
Confusion?, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 745, 757 (2003) (noting developing-country suspicion of 
developed countries’ environmental concerns after the Shrimp-Turtle ruling, WTO Appellate 
Body Report on United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC, which authorized the United States to restrict the importation of 
shrimp harvested without adequate protections for sea turtles). 
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European Communities’ (EC’s) Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP),3 through which the EC offers preferential market access to the 
exports of developing countries. The international GSP framework, 
premised on the belief that preferential tariffs encourage export 
growth and facilitate economic development,4 authorizes developed 
WTO members to provide developing countries with tariffs lower 
than the tariffs provided to other developed nations. As such, the 
GSP is the primary vehicle by which developed countries have 
implemented their commitment to “special and differential 
treatment” for developing countries.5 
Over the course of the GSP’s thirty-year existence, both 
developing countries and scholars have lamented developed-country 
efforts, especially the efforts of the United States, to differentiate 
among developing countries in granting GSP benefits.6 Scholars 
contend that the threat of removal or reduction of GSP benefits 
eviscerates the very purpose of the GSP—providing incentives for 
 
 3. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities—Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) 
[hereinafter EC—GSP Appellate Body Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246ABR.doc. 
 4. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment”: The GATT 
Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488, 492–93 (1980) (justifying the GSP on economic 
grounds). 
 5. “Special and differential treatment” is a cornerstone of the ongoing round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. See WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
para. 44 (Nov. 14, 2001) (“We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are 
an integral part of the WTO Agreements.”), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
 6. See, e.g., FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF JUST TRADE 156–68 (2003) (concluding that egalitarian fairness principles, such as 
Rawls’s “justice as fairness,” oblige developed countries to provide unconditional and 
nonexclusive trade preferences to developing countries); ÇAGLAR ÖZDEN & ERIC REINHARDT, 
THE PERVERSITY OF PREFERENCES: GSP AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE POLICIES, 
1976–2000, at 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2955, 2003) (noting that the 
“political process leading to GSP decisions” prevents developing countries from building their 
export sectors for fear that preferences will be removed), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/23188_wps2955.pdf; Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: 
Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 1033 (2000) (contending 
that it is morally unjustifiable for developed countries to terminate GSP preferences for political 
reasons); Robert Howse, India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the 
European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major 
Repercussions for “Political” Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 385, 395 
(2003) (noting “persistent concern by developing countries about conditionality and selectivity 
in GSP schemes”); Peter Lichtenbaum, “Special Treatment” vs. “Equal Participation:” Striking a 
Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1015–16 (2002) (highlighting 
the detrimental effects of conditionality in the U.S. GSP). 
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developing countries to invest in industrial capacity.7 Likewise, 
developing countries point to the obvious economic consequences of 
differentiation among GSP recipients; India’s recent challenge to the 
EC’s scheme was prompted by the $300 million that its exporters 
were allegedly losing annually because of the EC’s more favorable 
GSP treatment for Pakistan.8 Until recently, these criticisms fell on 
deaf ears, partly because developing countries did not dare officially 
challenge GSP schemes9 and partly because developed countries 
firmly believed that differentiation was permissible.10 
Much of the criticism of GSP schemes has focused on the U.S. 
GSP, which is the most conditional—and hence controversial—of any 
scheme. Differentiation in the U.S. GSP takes three forms: one, the 
United States provides more favorable preferences to groups of 
developing countries;11 two, it withdraws GSP preferences entirely if 
developing countries fail to meet certain conditions;12 and, three, it 
“graduates” beneficiaries from its GSP when those countries are 
sufficiently competitive.13 In a recent ruling on the EC’s GSP scheme, 
 
 7. See GARCIA, supra note 6, at 157 (“[GSP] programs . . . are subject to periodic renewal, 
and within each program the beneficiaries must continually re-qualify for the preferences. This 
creates problems for business and investment planners on both sides of the preference.”); 
ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 21 (“Since ‘he who giveth may taketh away,’ the non-
guaranteed nature of GSP Preferences prevents the recipients from fully focusing on their 
export sectors.”). 
 8. See MISSION OF INDIA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REPORT FOR 
JANUARY, 2003, at 10 (2003) (“Pakistan’s inclusion in the scheme costs India over $300 million a 
year in lost trade . . . .”), available at http://www.cii-eu.org/ecreports/jan2003.pdf. 
 9. See Kyle Bagwell et al., The Boundaries of the WTO: It’s a Question of Market Access, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 71 (2002) (speculating that developing countries refrained from 
challenging GSP schemes to stay “on good terms” with donors). 
 10. See Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but Not Quite Yet: 
India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union’s 
Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2003) (“[I]t was . . . 
conventional wisdom that conditions . . . could be placed on voluntary and non-binding 
preferences granted to developing countries under the Generalized System of 
Preferences . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2466a (2000) (providing additional GSP benefits for eligible sub-
Saharan African countries); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, art. 10, 2001 O.J. (L 346) 1, 5 
(authorizing additional GSP preferences for twelve countries participating in the EC’s special 
arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking). 
 12. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A) (prohibiting the granting of U.S. GSP preferences 
to some Communist countries); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 
26.1(c), 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 9 (withdrawing, on a temporary basis, preferences from countries 
failing to protect certain labor standards). 
 13. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (requiring the withdrawal of GSP benefits from countries 
that the World Bank designates as “high income” countries); see also Council Regulation 
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the WTO Appellate Body questioned the legitimacy of the first form 
of differentiation, concluding that developed countries may not 
discriminatorily provide additional GSP preferences to some GSP 
beneficiaries.14 Although the Appellate Body did not rule on the 
remaining two types of differentiation—complete withdrawal of 
beneficiary status on the basis of certain conditions and the 
graduation of competitive beneficiaries—its reasoning nonetheless 
sheds light on the legitimacy of these types of differentiation in the 
U.S. GSP. 
This Note develops the Appellate Body’s reasoning with respect 
to all three types of differentiation in the U.S. GSP. From this 
reasoning, the Note derives a framework under which graduation and 
some conditionality mechanisms in the U.S. scheme are probably 
legitimate, whereas other conditionality mechanisms and 
discriminatory regional schemes are probably not. Part I describes the 
legislative history of the GSP system, focusing on the relevant legal 
instruments established in the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).15 Part II outlines the U.S. GSP, 
emphasizing the mechanisms by which it provides additional 
preferences to regional groups, withdraws preferences entirely if 
countries fail to comply with certain conditions, and graduates 
recipients. Part III then summarizes the recent Appellate Body 
Report. Finally, Part IV proposes a framework for analyzing the 
legitimacy of regional preferences, conditionality, and graduation in 
the U.S. GSP. 
I.  THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES IN UNCTAD,  
THE GATT, AND THE WTO 
The GATT international trade framework was founded on the 
twin pillars of nondiscrimination and reciprocity.16 The cornerstone of 
 
2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 2–3 (removing GSP eligibility in the EC 
scheme on the basis of World Bank classification and certain calculations). 
 14. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 190. 
 15. The GATT is the predecessor organization to the WTO, which was established in 1994. 
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS—THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (establishing a 
new multilateral trading system encompassing the GATT). 
 16. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. A-11, A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter GATT] (expressing the founding governments’ desire to 
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the nondiscrimination principle is the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
Clause of Article I:1 of the 1947 GATT Agreement, which mandates 
that all advantages granted to one country “be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally” to like products from other countries.17 Despite 
the fundamental importance of Article I:1 to the GATT framework, 
the GATT members deviated from its requirements soon after the 
founding of the GATT18 to provide special and differential treatment 
to developing countries. 
Special and differential treatment, which WTO members have 
recognized as a key principle of international trade,19 alters the 
foundational requirements of reciprocity and nondiscrimination for 
developing countries. On the one hand, developed countries have 
recognized that they “do not expect reciprocity for [tariff] 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations” with developing 
countries.20 On the other hand, through the GSP, developed countries 
may favor developing countries in extending tariff preferences—that 
is, they may charge lower tariffs on imports from developing 
countries—notwithstanding the MFN obligation of Article I:1.21 This 
Part outlines the evolution of the GSP and the legal instruments 
governing its implementation. 
A. Origins of the Generalized System of Preferences 
In the 1960s, developing countries began advocating the 
establishment of a system of preferential tariffs to promote the 
development of infant industries in developing countries.22 Because 
 
“enter[] into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce”). 
 17. Id. art. I:1. 
 18. Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 1007. 
 19. See WTO Agreement pmbl. (“T]here is need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries . . . secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development.”). 
 20. GATT art. XXXVI:8. Article XXXVI was added to the GATT in 1965. Protocol 
Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and 
Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, 572 U.N.T.S. 320. 
 21. Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28. 1979, para. 1, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 
203, 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. 
 22. See Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing 
Countries: International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 513, 514–15 
(1978) (describing the first proposal for such preferences from Raúl Prebisch, Secretary General 
of UNCTAD). 
MASON FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
518 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:513 
developing-country markets were too small to support the 
development of manufacturing industries, these countries clamored 
for temporary preferential access to developed markets to nurture 
such industries.23 At the First Session of UNCTAD in 1964, developed 
countries, led by the United States, opposed developing-country 
initiatives in support of such preferences.24 By UNCTAD’s Second 
Session (UNCTAD II) in 1968, however, the developed countries, 
including the United States, came to support the general principle of 
a system of preferences but did not agree on its details.25 The 
UNCTAD II participants adopted Resolution 21(II), recognizing 
“unanimous agreement in favour of the early establishment of a 
mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to the 
developing countries.”26 The Resolution established a Special 
Committee on Preferences to work out the details of this system.27 
In the Special Committee, developed and developing countries 
negotiated the details of unilateral GSP schemes proposed by 
individual developed countries.28 In 1970, the Committee adopted the 
Agreed Conclusions, confirming that the proposed schemes, as 
revised during the negotiations, were “mutually acceptable” to both 
 
 23. Anthony N. Cole, Note, Labor Standards and the Generalized System of Preferences: 
The European Labor Incentives, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2003). 
 24. See Kelé Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the 
European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 425, 448 (1994) (describing 
developed-country opposition to the developing world’s arguments for the establishment of 
preferential tariffs); Graham, supra note 22, at 516 (highlighting the United States’ role in this 
opposition). 
 25. Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 449. Two factors prompted the United States to support 
the concept of the GSP. One, it was facing increasing pressure from the Latin American 
countries to implement a preferential system similar to that of the EC. Graham, supra note 22, 
at 516. Two, it “saw in the GSP an opportunity to halt the trend towards cartelization of world 
trade through exclusive preferential arrangements.” Id. at 516–17. 
 26. Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on Its Second 
Session, U.N. TDBOR, 2d Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 11, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/97/Annexes 
(1968), reprinted in WTO Panel Report on European Communities—Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) 
[hereinafter EC—GSP Panel Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/WT/DS/246R-00.doc, annex D-3, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ 
WT/DS/246R-04.doc.  
 27. Id. para. 2. 
 28. For an overview of the content of the initial submissions, see generally R. 
Krishnamurti, Tariff Preferences in Favour of Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 447 
(1970). 
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developed and developing countries.29 The Agreed Conclusions also 
affirmed the legitimacy of several key principles of the schemes. First, 
they expressed the consensus that “all developing countries should 
participate as beneficiaries from the outset,”30 with beneficiary status 
determined according to the principle of self-election.31 Second, the 
Conclusions explicitly permitted a priori limitations on the quantity of 
goods that could be imported through the GSP.32 Finally, the 
Conclusions acknowledged the temporary, nonbinding nature of the 
tariff preferences and conditioned the establishment of the system on 
obtaining the necessary GATT waivers.33 
B. The 1971 Waiver Decision 
In 1971, the GATT members waived the MFN requirement for 
ten years “to the extent necessary to permit developed contracting 
parties . . . to accord preferential tariff treatment to products 
originating in developing countries . . . with a view to extending to 
such countries and territories generally the preferential tariff 
treatment referred to in the Preamble to this Decision.”34 The 
preamble described such tariff treatment as “a mutually acceptable 
system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
preferences beneficial to the developing countries” as agreed to at 
UNCTAD II.35 The preamble also recognized that the granting of 
tariff preferences was not a binding commitment on the part of the 
developed countries.36 
 
 29. Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences, U.N. TDBOR, 4th Sess., 
267th mtg., Annex 1, para. I.9, U.N. Doc. TD/B/330 (1970) [hereinafter Agreed Conclusions], 
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1083, 1084 (1971).  
 30. Id. para. II.1. 
 31. Id. para. IV.1. The principle of self-election means simply that countries will elect to be 
deemed “developing” for purposes of receiving GSP benefits. Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 457. 
The principle assumes that countries will not make such an election without bona fide grounds 
for doing so. Id. 
 32. Agreed Conclusions, supra note 29, paras. III.1–4. 
 33. Id. para. IX.2. 
 34. Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972) [hereinafter 1971 Waiver]. The waiver is generally understood 
to rest on GATT Article XXV:5, which authorizes waivers “[i]n exceptional circumstances,” 
even though the waiver does not explicitly refer to this article. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The 
WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program, 
6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 512 (2003) (discussing the adoption of the 1971 waiver); Yusuf, supra 
note 4, at 491 (same). 
 35. 1971 Waiver, supra note 34, pmbl. 
 36. Id. 
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C. The Enabling Clause 
Faced with the upcoming expiry of the ten-year waiver, in 1979 
the GATT members adopted the Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries (Enabling Clause).37 The Enabling Clause 
permits preferential treatment for developing countries 
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General 
Agreement.”38 
The central provision of the Enabling Clause is paragraph 2(a), 
which expressly authorizes the provision of tariff preferences to 
developing countries “as described in [the 1971 waiver], relating to 
the establishment of ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries.’”39 
This reference to the 1971 waiver, contained in footnote three, 
directly links the Enabling Clause to the GSP system initiated at 
UNCTAD II.40 The Enabling Clause also authorizes several other 
types of preferential treatment, such as regional arrangements among 
developing countries to reduce tariffs,41 special treatment for the 
least-developed countries,42 and nontariff measures governed by 
instruments negotiated under the GATT.43 
Several additional provisions of the Enabling Clause clarify the 
obligations of both developed and developing countries participating 
 
 37. Enabling Clause, supra note 21. 
 38. Id. para. 1. 
 39. Id. para. 2(a) n.3. 
 40. Until the recent Appellate Body decision, see supra note 3, this linkage had fueled 
scholarly debate as to whether the 1971 waiver’s preamble imposed binding conditions on GSP 
schemes. At least one commentator reasoned that footnote three’s reference was merely 
aspirational. See Howse, supra note 10, at 1352–53 (interpreting the conditions as nonbinding); 
Howse, supra note 6, at 394 (same). In contrast, other commentators concluded that it was 
binding. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 34, at 520 (arguing that, although the preamble to the 1971 
waiver was aspirational, the Enabling Clause converted these aspirational conditions into 
binding requirements); William J. Davey & Joost Pauwelyn, MFN Conditionality: A Legal 
Analysis of the Concept in View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with 
Particular Reference to the Issue of “Like Product”, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 13, 24–25 (Thomas Cottier & 
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (noting disagreement as to the nature of these conditions but 
pointing to the preamble of the 1971 waiver as an indication that they were binding); Yusuf, 
supra note 4, at 495 (asserting that developed countries offering preferences could neither 
discriminate among developing states nor demand reciprocal concessions).  
 41. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(c). 
 42. Id. para. 2(d). 
 43. Id. para. 2(b). 
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in GSP schemes. Paragraph 3(c) requires that preferential treatment 
for developing countries “be designed . . . to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.”44 
Similarly, developed countries may not seek concessions inconsistent 
with the needs of developing countries45 and may not use preferences 
“to create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting 
parties.”46 In contrast, as their economies develop, developing 
countries are expected to “participate more fully in the framework of 
rights and obligations under the General Agreement.”47 
II.  THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
As of 2002, sixteen countries had implemented GSP schemes.48 
The U.S. GSP was enacted in the 1974 Trade Act, which authorizes 
the president to eliminate tariffs on imports from eligible developing 
countries.49 In designating eligible products and countries, the 
president is to consider four overarching factors: the anticipated 
effect on the economic development of the country in question, the 
extent to which other developed countries are granting such 
preferences, the impact on U.S. producers of like products, and the 
competitiveness of the beneficiary country.50 
The U.S. scheme limits the products eligible for GSP treatment. 
In 2000, only 47 percent of imports from GSP beneficiary countries 
received preferential access under the GSP.51 All eligible articles 
receive duty-free access,52 but certain import-sensitive products, such 
 
 44. Id. para. 3(c). 
 45. Id. para. 5. 
 46. Id. para. 3(a). 
 47. Id. para. 7. Commentators argue that this provision justifies the “graduation” of high-
income developing countries from GSP schemes. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. MCMAHON, 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, PROTECTIONISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT: A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 129–30 (1992). For examples of graduation mechanisms in GSP schemes, see infra 
note 92 and accompanying text. 
 48. The sixteen countries are Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
the EC, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., 
About GSP, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 49. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 501–505, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066–71 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461–2467 (2000)). For a detailed discussion of the 
enactment of the U.S. GSP, see generally Graham, supra note 22. 
 50. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2000). 
 51. ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 5. 
 52. 19 U.S.C. § 2461. 
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as some textiles, watches, footwear, and certain electronic, steel, and 
glass products, are excluded from eligibility.53 Furthermore, the Trade 
Act imposes “competitive need limitations” that effectively serve as 
quotas, cutting off preferential treatment when a beneficiary’s annual 
exports of a product reach a predetermined level.54 
The three main forms of differentiation—the provision of 
additional preferences to regional groups of beneficiaries, the 
withdrawal of preferences on the basis of certain criteria, and the 
“graduation” of competitive countries—are prominent in the U.S. 
scheme. This Part explores the mechanisms by which the U.S. GSP 
implements each type of differentiation. 
A. Regional Preferences 
The U.S. GSP provides additional preferences to some recipients 
primarily by means of three regional programs: the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI),55 the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA),56 and 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).57 All three 
programs provide duty-free access for some products that are 
excluded from the general GSP scheme.58 CBI, which is limited to 
twenty-seven beneficiary countries,59 attempts to achieve a “stable 
 
 53. Id. § 2463(b)(1). In contrast, the EC scheme provides duty-free access to nonsensitive 
imports and a reduction in tariff rates to some import-sensitive products. Council Regulation 
2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 7.1–.2, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 3. 
 54. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2). Competitive need limitations may be waived to further national 
economic interests or to maintain “a historical preferential trade relationship” between the 
United States and a beneficiary country. Id. § 2463(d). These limitations implement the a priori 
limitations agreed to in the Agreed Conclusions. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 55. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 201–231, 97 Stat. 369, 
384–98 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 33 
U.S.C.). 
 56. Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, §§ 201–208, 105 Stat. 1233, 1236–44 
(1991) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201–3206 (2000)). 
 57. African Growth and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, §§ 101–131, 114 Stat. 251, 
252–75 (2000) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2466a, 3701–3741 (2000)). For criticism of 
all three regional preference programs, see generally GARCIA, supra note 6, at 162–65. 
 58. See 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(b)(1) (authorizing duty-free access for products excluded under 
the general GSP scheme so long as they are not import-sensitive when imported from sub-
Saharan Africa); id. § 2703 (authorizing duty-free access for all Caribbean products other than 
certain textiles, footwear, tuna, petroleum, watches, and leather goods); id. § 3203(b)(1) 
(permitting duty-free access for, inter alia, footwear, petroleum, watches, and handbags from the 
Andean countries). 
 59. Id. § 2702. 
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political and economic climate in the Caribbean region.”60 ATPA’s 
purpose is more narrow—to “creat[e] viable alternatives to illicit 
trade in coca”61—but, like CBI, its preferences are available to only a 
select group of countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.62 
AGOA trade preferences, which aim to promote “stable and 
sustainable economic growth and development in sub-Saharan 
Africa,”63 are available to forty-eight African countries.64 The United 
States obtained waivers of its GATT obligations for the CBI65 and 
ATPA programs,66 but the waiver for ATPA expired in 2001.67 No 
waiver has been approved for AGOA.68 
In addition, the United States favors the least-developed 
countries, which receive duty-free access for an additional 1770 
articles excluded under the general scheme69 and are exempt from 
competitive need limitations.70 The Enabling Clause permits such 
special treatment for the least-developed countries.71 
 
 60. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382,  
§ 202, 104 Stat. 655, 655 (1990). 
 61. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 3102, 116 
Stat. 1023, 1023 (2002). 
 62. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(b)(1). 
 63. Id. § 3701(a). 
 64. Id. § 3706. 
 65. WTO, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act—Renewal of Waiver, WT/L/104 
(Nov. 24, 1995), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/104.WPF. 
 66. WTO, United States-Andean Trade Preference Act—Decision of 14 October 1996, 
WT/L/184 (Oct. 14, 1996), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ 
WT/L/184.WPF. 
 67. See id. para. 1 (extending the waiver until December 4, 2001). 
 68. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, annex E (listing all waivers that the WTO 
had approved before the EC-India Panel ruling), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246R-05.doc.  
 69. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK 1 (1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file333_5430.pdf; see also 19 U.S.C.  
§ 2463(a)(l)(B) (authorizing duty-free access for products from least-developed countries that 
are ineligible for such treatment under the general scheme). 
 70. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(D). 
 71. See Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(d) (permitting “[s]pecial treatment of the 
least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific 
measures in favour of developing countries”). 
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B. Conditionality 
All GSP schemes condition preferences to some degree72 in the 
form of either “positive” or “negative” conditionality. Positive 
conditionality is the practice of granting additional concessions to 
developing countries that fulfill prescribed criteria;73 positive 
conditionality affects preferences offered to countries that are already 
GSP beneficiaries. For instance, the EC provides additional 
reductions in GSP tariffs to countries that take prescribed legislative 
steps to protect fundamental labor rights.74 In contrast, negative 
conditionality—more commonly used in GSP schemes—denotes the 
withdrawal of concessions from countries that fail to comply with 
prescribed criteria, or the refusal to grant concessions to such 
countries from the outset.75 As such, negative conditionality affects 
the designation of beneficiary status. 
The U.S. GSP, which has received the most ardent criticism,76 
primarily employs negative conditionality; instead of granting 
additional preferences to specific developing countries, it withdraws 
GSP preferences from countries that do not meet certain conditions. 
Some conditions trigger mandatory withdrawal or denial of GSP 
benefits,77 whereas others are discretionary factors for consideration 
in determining beneficiary status.78 The conditions generally fall into 
three overarching categories: (1) political conditions, (2) human rights 
conditions, and (3) conditions related to U.S. economic interests. 
 
 72. See Howse, supra note 10, at 1359 (“All GSP schemes contain elements of selectivity 
and conditionality . . . .”). 
 73. Diego J. Linan Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionality 
in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 307, 309 (2001). 
 74. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, arts. 8.1(a), 14–20, 2001 O.J. (L 346)  
at 4, 6–7. 
 75. See Linan Nogueras & Hinojosa Martinez, supra note 73, at 309 (analyzing human 
rights conditionality in EC trade practice); see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A) (prohibiting U.S. 
GSP preferences for some Communist countries); Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, 
art. 26.1(c), 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 9 (allowing the temporary withdrawal of preferences from 
countries that fail to protect certain labor standards). 
 76. See MCMAHON, supra note 47, at 142 (“The most controversial approach to beneficiary 
selection has been taken by the United States.”); see, e.g., ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6 
(criticizing the U.S. GSP). 
 77. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2) (“The President shall not designate any country a 
beneficiary developing country . . . if any of the following applies . . . .”). 
 78. See id. § 2462(c) (“In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary 
developing country . . . the President shall take into account . . . .”). 
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Political conditions prohibit granting GSP treatment to countries 
that are Communist,79 belong to a commodity cartel,80 or aid terrorists 
or fail to support U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.81 The human rights 
conditions exclusively concern labor standards; countries that fail to 
afford internationally recognized worker rights or to eliminate the 
worst forms of child labor are ineligible for GSP benefits.82 
“Internationally recognized worker rights” include the right of 
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the 
prohibition of forced labor, a minimum age for the employment of 
children, and the maintenance of acceptable work conditions.83 The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) has recognized all but the 
maintenance of acceptable work conditions as “fundamental.”84 
A country’s failure to protect the economic interests of U.S. 
exporters or investors may trigger mandatory or discretionary 
withdrawal of GSP benefits. For example, countries that provide 
preferential access to products of another developed country are 
ineligible for GSP treatment.85 Additionally, GSP treatment may be 
withdrawn on a discretionary basis because of unfair export 
practices,86 the existence of trade-distorting investment measures,87 or 
failure to protect intellectual property rights.88 Countries are ineligible 
for preferential access if they nationalize property owned by U.S. 
citizens or entities without providing “prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation,”89 or if they fail to recognize or enforce 
arbitral awards favoring U.S. citizens or entities.90 
 
 79. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(A). 
 80. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(B). 
 81. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(F). 
 82. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(G)–(H). 
 83. Id. § 2467(4). 
 84. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Sess., para. 2 
(June 18, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration]. 
 85. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(C). 
 86. Id. § 2462(c)(4). 
 87. Id. § 2462(c)(6). 
 88. Id. § 2462(c)(5). 
 89. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(D). 
 90. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(E). 
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C. Graduation 
For purposes of GSP schemes, a country’s status as “developing” 
is generally governed by the principle of self-election.91 However, the 
U.S. GSP mandates the “graduation” of countries that have reached a 
certain level of development92 on the theory that such countries no 
longer need preferential treatment to compete in developed 
markets.93 The United States measures a country’s level of 
development primarily by reference to World Bank calculations,94 
although it may also consider certain discretionary factors.95 
III.  THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT: THE MEANING OF  
“NON-DISCRIMINATORY” 
Despite longstanding dissatisfaction with aspects of many GSP 
schemes, until 2002 developing countries had refrained from 
challenging the schemes’ validity.96 The landscape changed 
dramatically when India requested the establishment of a panel to 
review the EC’s GSP system.97 Before the WTO Dispute Settlement 
 
 91. See Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 457 (noting developed-country agreement to the 
principle of self-election). 
 92. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (“graduating” countries that the World Bank has designated as 
“high-income” countries). By 2002, thirty-six countries had been graduated from the U.S. GSP. 
ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 5. The EC GSP, which graduates countries that have 
met certain requirements for three consecutive years, is another example of a mandatory 
graduation scheme. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 
2–3. 
 93. See MCMAHON, supra note 47, at 129–30 (explaining that developed countries have 
read the Enabling Clause to permit the graduation of successful GSP beneficiaries). 
 94. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e). 
 95. See id. § 2462(c) (allowing consideration of factors such as a country’s desire to 
participate, a country’s level of economic development, and a country’s participation in other 
GSP schemes). 
 96. Bagwell et al., supra note 9, at 71. 
 97. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities—
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 
9, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-4.doc; see also 
Request for Consultations by India, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/l (Mar. l2, 2002) [hereinafter Request 
for Consultations by India], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/G/L/521.doc. India initially challenged not only the Drug Arrangements but also the special 
incentive arrangements for labor and the environment. See Request for Consultations by India, 
supra, paras. 1–2. India later limited its arguments to the Drug Arrangements. EC—GSP Panel 
Report, supra note 26, para. 1.5. Brazil had previously requested consultations concerning the 
EC’s GSP program but did not subsequently request the establishment of a panel. See Request 
for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, 
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Body,98 India challenged the legitimacy of the EC’s Drug 
Arrangements, through which twelve countries qualified for duty-free 
access on products for which other GSP beneficiaries, such as India, 
received only tariff reductions.99 A WTO Panel ruled in favor of India 
on December 1, 2003, proclaiming that virtually no differentiation of 
any kind was permissible under the Enabling Clause.100 On April 7, 
2004, the WTO Appellate Body affirmed the Panel’s ruling that the 
Drug Arrangements were invalid but modified much of the Panel’s 
legal analysis,101 leaving open the possibility that the Enabling Clause 
permits some differentiation.102 
The Appellate Body expressly limited its analysis to the question 
of whether a donor country may discriminate among developing 
countries that are already beneficiaries under its GSP,103 declining to 
examine whether donor states can employ conditionality to exclude 
some developing countries entirely or graduate countries from their 
GSP schemes.104 Nonetheless, its ruling sheds light on how it might 
approach such questions in the future. This Part briefly summarizes 
the EC-India dispute, the Panel’s ruling, and, most importantly, the 
 
WT/DS209/1 (Oct. 19, 2000), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/G/L/399.doc. 
 98. The Dispute Settlement Body administers the dispute settlement process in the WTO. 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
art. 2, WTO Agreement, Annex 2. Parties with complaints as to another party’s WTO 
obligations may request the establishment of a panel composed of three “well-qualified 
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals.” Id. arts. 6, 8. Appeals may be brought to 
the Appellate Body, a standing body of seven individuals, three of whom serve on any given 
case. Id. art. 17. Appellate Body reports are automatically adopted by the Dispute Settlement 
Body unless there is a consensus not to adopt a report. Id. 
 99. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 4.38 (arguing that the Drug 
Arrangements rendered Indian textile exporters less competitive than their Pakistani 
counterparts receiving the additional preferences); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra 
note 11, arts. 10, 25, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 5, 8 (authorizing duty-free access for exports from 
twelve countries that otherwise would qualify for a simple tariff reduction under the general 
GSP scheme). The EC had requested a waiver for the Drug Arrangements, but no action had 
been taken on the waiver request. See Request for a Waiver, New EC Special Tariff 
Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking, G/C/W/328 (Oct. 24, 2001) 
(requesting a waiver from Article I), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/G/C/W328.doc. 
 100. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.176–.177 (noting that the Enabling 
Clause permits only two types of differentiation—a priori limitations and special treatment of 
the least-developed countries). 
 101. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 190. 
 102. See id. paras. 142–67 (explaining the meaning of “non-discriminatory”). 
 103. Id. para. 128. 
 104. See id. 
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Appellate Body’s ruling. Part IV then analyzes the ruling’s broader 
ramifications for the U.S. GSP. 
A. Basis for the Dispute: The EC’s Drug Arrangements 
Under its GSP program, the EC provides duty-free access for 
nonsensitive products and reduced tariff rates for sensitive products 
from all GSP recipients.105 It operates, however, three incentive 
arrangements that further reduce or eliminate tariffs on some 
sensitive products for certain countries—a form of positive 
conditionality.106 The special incentive arrangements for protection of 
labor rights and the environment are available to all beneficiaries 
demonstrating adherence to international labor standards or 
international standards concerning sustainable management of 
tropical forests.107 The preferences under the incentive arrangement to 
combat drug production and trafficking—the subject of the EC-India 
dispute—are limited by regulation to only twelve countries.108 
Motivating India’s challenge were the more beneficial tariff 
preferences that Pakistani exporters were receiving under the Drug 
Arrangements.109 Before the Panel and Appellate Body, India argued 
that the Drug Arrangements violated the EC’s MFN obligation110 and 
 
 105. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 7.1–.2, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 3. 
 106. For a discussion of positive conditionality, see supra note 73 and accompanying text. In 
July 2004, the European Commission proposed a simplified GSP program combining the three 
incentive arrangements into a unified “GSP+” program, which would provide incentives to 
“countries that accept the main international conventions on social rights, environmental 
protection and governance, including the fight against drugs production and trafficking.”  
Press Release, European Commission, Developing Countries: Commission Unveils System of 
Trade Preferences for Next Ten Years (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/860&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also Developing Countries, International Trade and 
Sustainable Development: The Function of the Community’s Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) for the Ten-Year Period from 2006 to 2015, COM(2004) 461 final at 8, 9–10 
(proposing the same system). The new GSP scheme would take effect in 2006. 
 107. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, arts. 8, 14, 21, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 4, 6, 7. 
 108. Id. art. 10, annex I, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 5, 13–18. The twelve countries are Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Id. annex I, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 13–18. 
 109. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 4.38 (“[I]n the case of the tariff 
preferences accorded to textiles and clothing products from Pakistan, the true ‘donor’ countries 
are India and other developing countries that compete directly with Pakistan’s exports to the 
European Communities.”). 
 110. Id. paras. 4.8–.14.  
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were not justified by the Enabling Clause.111 India read footnote three 
of the Enabling Clause, which refers to “the establishment of 
‘generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory preferences 
beneficial to the developing countries’”112 in the 1971 waiver, to 
impose binding requirements on GSP donors, and it interpreted 
“non-discriminatory” to require that all developing-country 
beneficiaries receive the same preferences.113 According to India, 
paragraph 2(a), by describing preferences “beneficial to the 
developing countries,” confirms that donors must provide the same 
treatment to all developing countries.114 
In response, the EC asserted that the reference to “non-
discriminatory” in footnote three of the Enabling Clause does not 
require developed countries to provide identical tariff treatment to all 
beneficiaries.115 Instead, it argued, developed countries may 
differentiate among “developing countries which, according to 
objective criteria, have different development needs.”116 Hence, the 
EC contended, the Drug Arrangements were justifiable under the 
Enabling Clause because they were based on “an overall assessment 
of the gravity of the drug problem in each developing country made 
in accordance with objective, non-discriminatory criteria.”117 
B. The Panel Ruling 
The Panel not only found the Drug Arrangements discriminatory 
and, hence, invalid but also condemned virtually any and all 
differentiation in GSP schemes, obliterating developed countries’ 
assumptions about their ability to condition GSP benefits. As a 
threshold matter, the Panel concluded that the Enabling Clause is an 
 
 111. Id. paras. 4.31–.41. India argued that the Enabling Clause should be construed as an 
exception to Article I:1. Id. paras. 4.27–.28. 
 112. Id. para. 4.31 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3). 
 113. Id. para. 4.33. 
 114. Id. para. 4.35. 
 115. Id. para. 4.47. Before raising its Enabling Clause arguments, the EC first argued that 
the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1 but rather an “autonomous and 
permanent right.” Id. para. 4.42. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. para. 4.75. The EC also asserted as a defense GATT Article XX, arguing that the 
Drug Arrangements were “necessary for the protection of human life or health.” Id. para. 4.91. 
The EC did not appeal the Panel’s ruling on this issue. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 3, para. 78 (listing the issues that the EC appealed). Further discussion of this 
defense is outside the scope of this Note. 
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exception to Article I:1, as India had argued.118 Consequently, the 
Panel held that the EC bore the burden of asserting the Enabling 
Clause as a defense and of proving the Arrangements’ compatibility 
with the Clause.119 
Because the Drug Arrangements were “accorded only on the 
condition that the receiving countries [were] experiencing a certain 
gravity of drug problems,” the Panel found that they were not 
“unconditional” as required by Article I:1,120 which the Panel 
interpreted as meaning that tariffs must “not [be] limited by or 
subject to any conditions.”121 For this reason, the Panel proceeded to 
analyze the EC’s affirmative Enabling Clause defense. 
The Panel first focused its Enabling Clause analysis on paragraph 
2(a) and footnote three to that paragraph,122 which together authorize 
preferential tariff treatment as described in the 1971 waiver. It also 
considered paragraph 3(c),123 which mandates that GSP schemes 
“respond positively to the needs of developing countries.”124 Finding 
the text of these provisions vague, the Panel turned to the Agreed 
Conclusions, which it regarded as “preparatory work” for the 
Enabling Clause.125 
According to the Panel, the Agreed Conclusions reflected a 
comprehensive understanding that all developing countries were to 
receive preferential treatment on an equal basis.126 Because the 
parties to the Conclusions had envisioned only two types of 
differentiation—a priori limitations and preferential treatment for the 
 
 118. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.35–.39; see supra note 111 
(summarizing India’s argument). 
 119. See id. para. 7.42 (requiring the EC to invoke the Enabling Clause as an affirmative 
defense and placing the burden of proof under the Enabling Clause on the EC). 
 120. Id. para. 7.60. 
 121. Id. para. 7.59. The Panel grounded this assertion on the ordinary meaning of the word 
“unconditional.” Id. 
 122. See id. para. 7.65 (“The main issue disputed by the parties is whether the Drug 
Arrangements are consistent with Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, particularly the 
requirement of ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 to this subparagraph.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c). 
 125. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.78–.86; cf. Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(2)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise . . . any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty . . . .”). 
 126. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.144. 
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least-developed countries127—the Enabling Clause permitted no other 
differentiation.128 Similarly, because the parties had agreed to “the 
levels of product coverage and depth of tariff cuts,” the Panel 
declared that “GSP schemes providing for lesser product coverage or 
depth of tariff cuts” would be illegitimate, even though this issue was 
not before the Panel.129 In light of its conclusion that GSP schemes 
must consider the needs of every developing country without 
differentiation,130 the Panel declared the Drug Arrangements 
invalid.131 
C. The Appellate Body Ruling 
Although the Appellate Body also found for India, ruling that 
the Drug Arrangements violated Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause, 
it reined in the Panel’s broad condemnation of virtually all 
differentiation in GSP schemes.132 Significantly, it left open the 
possibility that other forms of positive conditionality—if based on 
objective criteria—might be legitimate. 
Like the Panel, the Appellate Body commenced its analysis by 
examining the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling 
Clause. It, too, ruled that, because the Enabling Clause permits 
“differential and more favourable treatment” notwithstanding Article 
I:1, the Clause constitutes an exception to Article I:l’s MFN 
 
 127. See id. paras. 7.106–.115 (recognizing the validity of a priori limitations and special 
treatment for the least-developed countries). 
 128. Id. para. 7.116. In its discussion of the meaning of nondiscrimination, the Panel made 
broad findings on issues not implicated in the dispute. For example, it found that, for a 
developed country to comply with paragraph 3(c)’s requirement that it respond to the needs of 
developing countries, it would have to provide a “level of product coverage and depth of tariff 
cuts in general . . . no less than the level and depth offered and accepted in the Agreed 
Conclusions.” Id. The Appellate Body later recognized that the Panel “implicitly made findings 
on issues that were not before it.” EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 128. 
 129. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.95. Developed countries must have 
found this conclusion especially startling, given that the parties to the Agreed Conclusions 
recognized the nonbinding nature of GSP schemes. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 130. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.105. 
 131. Id. para. 7.177. 
 132. Consequently, the EC welcomed the Appellate Body Report, despite technically losing 
the dispute. See Press Release, European Commission, WTO India—GSP: WTO Confirms 
Differentiation Among Developing Countries Is Possible (Apr. 7, 2004) (“[The] decision makes 
it clear that we can continue, to give trade preferences to developing countries according to 
their particular situation and needs, provided this is done in an objective, non-discriminatory 
and transparent manner.” (quoting EC Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy)), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/476&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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requirement.133 In clarifying the relationship between Article I:1 and 
the Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body put forth a succinct test for 
the legitimacy of a provision allegedly taken under the Enabling 
Clause. First, “a dispute settlement panel should . . . examine the 
consistency of a challenged measure with Article I:1.”134 Only if the 
measure is inconsistent with Article I:1 is it necessary to consider 
whether the Enabling Clause justifies the measure.135 In this case, 
however, the Appellate Body proceeded directly to the second step of 
this test because the EC had not appealed the Panel’s ruling that the 
Drug Arrangements violated Article I:1.136 
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the Drug Arrangement’s 
conformity with the Enabling Clause turned on the nature of footnote 
three137—referring to the “generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory preferences” described in the 1971 waiver138—and the 
meaning of “non-discriminatory” therein.139 The Appellate Body 
ruled, over the objections of the EC, that footnote three, through its 
reference to the 1971 waiver, “imposes obligations that must be 
fulfilled for preferential tariff treatment to be justified under 
paragraph 2(a).”140 It grounded this conclusion on the French and 
Spanish versions of the Enabling Clause, which permit preferential 
tariff treatment “in accordance” with the GSP “as defined” in the 
1971 waiver.141 The French and Spanish versions, the Appellate Body 
found, confirm that footnote three imposes “obligatory” conditions.142 
 
 133. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 90. The Appellate Body noted, 
however, that the Enabling Clause “encourage[s] [WTO members] to deviate from Article I,” 
suggesting “special status . . . in the WTO system.” Id. paras. 110–11 (emphasis omitted). 
Consequently, the Appellate Body ruled that India was responsible for initially alleging 
inconsistency with the Enabling Clause, even if the ultimate burden of proof rested with the EC. 
Id. para. 118. This author is unaware of any other exceptions for which a complaining party 
bears the burden of alleging inconsistency with an exception. India had alleged inconsistency 
with the Enabling Clause in its written submissions and had therefore fulfilled this requirement. 
Id. para. 122. 
 134. Id. para. 101. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. para. 78 (listing the issues that the EC appealed). 
 137. See id. paras. 129–31 (explaining that India’s claim was “limited to the consistency of 
the Drug Arrangements with . . . footnote 3”). 
 138. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3.  
 139. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 131. 
 140. Id. para. 148 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. para. 147. For a brief exposition of scholarly debate on whether footnote three 
imposes binding obligations, see supra note 40. 
 142. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 147. 
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Having concluded that footnote three requires that GSP 
preferences be “non-discriminatory,” the Appellate Body considered 
the meaning of this term. Here, the Appellate Body disagreed with 
the Panel’s interpretation, ruling that the nondiscrimination 
requirement does not prohibit “treating different developing-country 
beneficiaries differently.”143 In so ruling, the Appellate Body 
concurred144 with the EC’s interpretation of “non-discriminatory” as 
permitting differentiation “between developing countries which have 
different development needs.”145 It premised this ruling on three 
considerations. 
First, the Appellate Body consulted footnote three’s reference to 
“generalized” preferences as context for interpreting “non-
discriminatory,” observing that the term “generalized” requires that 
GSP schemes be “generally applicable.”146 It noted that, in the context 
of the initial GSP negotiations, the “generalized” requirement was 
designed “to eliminate existing ‘special’ preferences that were granted 
only to certain designated developing countries.”147 Finding that the 
“generalized” requirement sufficed to prevent the reinstatement of 
such special preferences, the Appellate Body inferred that a 
nondiscrimination requirement encompassing identical tariffs to all 
participants would provide little additional value.148 
Second, and most importantly, the Appellate Body relied on 
paragraph 3(c), which provides that GSP treatment “shall . . . be 
designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.”149 
This provision suggests an obligation to respond positively to such 
needs,150 which, as the Appellate Body observed, may vary from 
country to country and over time.151 The Appellate Body qualified this 
 
 143. Id. para. 162. Recall that the Panel had held that the same preferences must be 
provided to all developing countries. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 144. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 162 (authorizing 
differentiation among developing-country beneficiaries). 
 145. Id. para. 149. 
 146. Id. para. 156. 
 147. Id. para. 155. 
 148. See id. para. 156 (criticizing the Panel’s conclusion that allowing differentiation would 
“result [in] the collapse of the whole GSP system” (alteration in original) (quoting EC—GSP 
Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.102)). 
 149. Id. para. 157 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c)). 
 150. Id. para. 158.  
 151. Id. para. 160. 
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finding in two respects. First, the existence of “development, financial 
[or] trade needs” must be based on “objective standards,” such as 
needs laid out in multilateral instruments.152 Second, a GSP response 
to such needs must be “positive,” that is, “consisting in or 
characterized by constructive action or attitudes.”153 
Finally, the Appellate Body found support for its conclusion in 
the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, which provides that 
there is “need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries . . . secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”154 
According to the Appellate Body, this language bolsters the 
conclusion that development needs may vary across countries.155 
Although the Appellate Body concluded that the Enabling 
Clause permits “the possibility of additional preferences for 
developing countries with particular needs,”156 it ultimately deemed 
the EC’s Drug Arrangements invalid.157 The ruling suggested that 
“the problem of illicit drug production and trafficking” might 
constitute a development need;158 in this case, however, the Appellate 
Body found that the Drug Arrangements provided no “objective 
criteria” by which countries with similar drug problems could qualify 
for the preferences.159 Consequently, the EC failed to demonstrate 
that the Drug Arrangements were nondiscriminatory. 
IV.  ARE U.S. GSP PREFERENCES “GENERALIZED, NON-
RECIPROCAL AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY”? 
The Appellate Body ruling, though binding only as to the EC’s 
Drug Arrangements, holds serious ramifications for the U.S. GSP. 
The most fundamental ramification is clear: the preferences provided 
under the U.S. GSP must be “generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-
discriminatory.”160 The exact meaning of these requirements, 
 
 152. Id. para. 163. 
 153. Id. para. 164. 
 154. Id. para. 168 (quoting WTO Agreement pmbl.). 
 155. Id. para. 169. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. para. 189. 
 158. Id. para 180; see id. (asserting that the Drug Arrangements would be valid only if the 
preferences were provided to “all GSP beneficiaries . . . similarly affected by the drug 
problem”). 
 159. Id. para. 183. 
 160. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3. 
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however, is vague. The Appellate Body’s ruling turned solely on the 
meaning of “non-discriminatory,” and, because the EC’s Drug 
Arrangements were obviously subjective in nature, the Appellate 
Body did not explore in detail what sorts of objective criteria would 
render preferences nondiscriminatory. Nonetheless, the ruling 
provides a starting point for interpreting these requirements and 
suggests that some parts of the U.S. GSP are probably illegitimate. 
This Part proffers a framework for analyzing consequences of the 
footnote three requirements for the key assumptions underlying the 
U.S. GSP. It first considers the requirement most thoroughly 
examined by the Appellate Body—nondiscrimination—and 
demonstrates that the U.S. regional GSP schemes are likely 
illegitimate absent waivers. It then considers the murkier question of 
whether the United States may condition beneficiary status, analyzing 
such conditions under both Article I:1 and the “generalized” 
requirement of the Enabling Clause. Here, this Part suggests that 
conditionality based on objective criteria to which developing 
countries have agreed in another context is likely valid. Finally, it 
demonstrates that the U.S. graduation mechanism would probably 
pass scrutiny under the Appellate Body’s analysis. 
A. Discrimination: The Likely Illegitimacy of the Regional GSP 
Schemes 
The Appellate Body helpfully distinguished between 
differentiation among countries that are beneficiaries of a GSP 
scheme and complete denial of GSP beneficiary status.161 The 
Appellate Body’s analysis applies only to differentiation among 
beneficiary countries. In the context of the U.S. GSP, such 
differentiation occurs almost exclusively by means of the regional 
GSP schemes: the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA).162 
The regional schemes, which are similar to the EC’s Drug 
Arrangements in that they provide extra preferences to select groups 
 
 161. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 162. For an explanation of the regional schemes, see supra Part II.A. Of course, the U.S. 
scheme also distinguishes between developing-country and least-developed country 
beneficiaries, but this distinction is explicitly authorized in the Enabling Clause and is not 
discussed further in this Note. See Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(d) (authorizing 
special treatment for the least-developed countries); supra Part II.A. 
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of countries, likely fail the nondiscrimination requirement. Regional 
preference schemes are not per se invalid under the Appellate Body’s 
analysis: if a region has an objective development need unique to that 
region, GSP schemes presumably can differentiate to take account of 
that need. In the U.S. scheme, however, there are no objective 
criteria, other than geographic ones, for selecting beneficiary 
countries; all three schemes are limited by statute to a closed universe 
of beneficiaries.163 
The regional schemes reveal the importance of responding to a 
widely recognized, “particular” development, financial, or trade 
need.164 ATPA arguably responds to a particular need—the 
elimination of drug production—although it lacks criteria by which to 
identify countries experiencing this need.165 In contrast, the goals of 
CBI and AGOA—economic development and stability—are not 
particular because they merely reflect the underlying goals of the 
GSP system in general. Given that all GSP beneficiaries are 
underdeveloped, it would be impossible for the United States to 
devise objective criteria based on “general” development needs that 
would differentiate CBI and AGAO recipients from others.166 Thus, 
for a regional GSP scheme to pass scrutiny under the Enabling 
Clause, it must respond to a particular need and must identify 
countries based on objective criteria. Because the U.S. schemes fail 
this test, they are discriminatory and require waivers.167 
B. Conditionality: The Possible Legitimacy of “Mutually Acceptable” 
Conditions 
The more daunting question is to what extent the United States 
may refuse to grant beneficiary status to countries that do not comply 
with certain conditions. The ramifications of the Appellate Body’s 
 
 163. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 183 (criticizing the Drug 
Arrangements for failing to specify criteria that would allow other “similarly affected” 
developing countries to qualify for the additional preferences); supra notes 59, 62, 64 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163 (noting that “[b]road-
based recognition of a particular need” could constitute an objective criterion). 
 165. See supra notes 61, 156 and accompanying text. 
 166. To clarify, the problem is that the United States provides additional benefits to some 
regional groupings, not that regional groupings exist per se. Presumably, if the United States 
provided the same benefits to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries but did so through 
regional GSP schemes, this approach would not be discriminatory. 
 167. There is a waiver in effect for CBI. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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ruling for this type of negative conditionality are much less clear. The 
legitimacy of U.S. conditionality depends on several factors, some of 
which the Appellate Body did not discuss in its analysis limited to the 
nondiscrimination requirement. First, the condition must be analyzed 
in the context of Article I:1 because if it does not violate Article I:1 
there is no need to resort to the Enabling Clause for justification. 
Second, if the condition is invalid under Article I:1, its consistency 
with the Enabling Clause’s “generalized” requirement must be 
examined. This second step entails analysis of what constitutes 
“development, financial and trade needs”168 beyond the analysis that 
the Appellate Body provided. Finally, it is possible that some other 
WTO provision or international instrument might validate the 
condition. 
1. The Meaning of “Unconditionally” under Article I:1. In 
describing the rule-exception relationship between the Enabling 
Clause and Article I:1, the Appellate Body put forward a threshold 
inquiry: 
[A] dispute settlement panel should, as a first step, examine the 
consistency of a challenged measure with Article I:1, as the general 
rule. If the measure is considered at this stage to be inconsistent with 
Article I:1, the panel should then examine, as a second step, whether 
the measure is nevertheless justified by the Enabling Clause.169 
In other words, if the challenged measure is consistent with Article 
I:1, there is no need to examine it under the Enabling Clause. 
The MFN Clause of Article I:1 requires that “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country . . . be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties.”170 The Appellate Body did not define “unconditionally” 
because the EC had not appealed the Panel’s ruling that the Drug 
Arrangements violated the MFN obligation of Article I:1.171 The 
Panel had defined “unconditionally” as “not limited by or subject to 
 
 168. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163 (quoting Enabling Clause, 
supra note 21, para. 3(c)).  
 169. Id. para. 101. 
 170. GATT art. I:1 (emphasis added). 
 171. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 124 n.259.  
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any conditions,”172 which presumably would render any condition 
imposed on the granting of a tariff preference per se invalid.173 
The Appellate Body has yet to clarify the scope of Article I:1’s 
“unconditionally” requirement. In Canada—Autos,174 the Appellate 
Body ruled that Article I:1 prohibits both de jure and de facto 
discrimination.175 Thus, an origin-neutral condition (one that is not de 
jure discriminatory), such as the measure in Canada—Autos,176 
violates Article I:1 if it results in de facto discrimination.177 Indeed, the 
Appellate Body stated that the purpose of Article I:1 is “to prohibit 
discrimination among like products originating in or destined for 
different countries,”178 emphasizing that an advantage granted to one 
member must be granted to “all other Members.”179 
Virtually all conditions in the U.S. GSP scheme are origin-
neutral: that is, the conditions, such as those conditioning GSP 
benefits on compliance with labor standards, apply to all potential 
beneficiaries. Consequently, the conditions violate Article I:1 only if 
they are de facto discriminatory. Canada—Autos suggests that 
conditionality in GSP schemes would constitute de facto 
discrimination, because those countries failing to meet a given 
condition would not receive the advantage. However, the precise 
 
 172. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.59. 
 173. See WorldTradeLaw.net, Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC): Panel Report, 
European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries 20, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/panel/ec-preferences(dsc)(panel).pdf (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (observing that the Panel’s “broad” 
interpretation apparently makes all conditions invalid). 
 174. WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139, 142/AB/R, para. 78 (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—
Autos Appellate Body Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ 
WT/DS/139ABR.doc. 
 175. Id. 
 176. In Canada—Autos, Canada provided import duty exemptions to manufacturers that 
had established a certain level of production in Canada. Id. paras. 7–9. The list of manufacturers 
eligible for this exemption was closed in 1998. Id. para. 9. The effect of the measure was to 
extend the exemption to a small group of mostly American manufacturers and their related 
companies. See id. para. 71 (listing General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and Volvo as the sole 
beneficiaries of the import duty exemptions). 
 177. Id. para. 78. 
 178. Id. para. 84 (emphasis added); see also Davey & Pauwelyn, supra note 40, at 41 
(proposing a de facto discrimination test on the basis of the “object and purpose of” Article I:1). 
One observer suggests that the plain text of Article I:1 might support such an interpretation of 
“unconditionally,” arguing that “‘unconditionally’ could be viewed as part of the non-
discrimination requirement.” WorldTradeLaw.net, supra note 173, at 21. 
 179. Canada—Autos Appellate Body Report, supra note 174, para. 79. 
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meaning of de facto discrimination remains unclear.180 In Canada—
Autos, it was virtually impossible for all exporters to comply with the 
origin-neutral condition in question.181 Thus, the condition was bound 
to result in de facto discrimination, even though it was not facially 
discriminatory. Developed countries might argue that a measure is 
not de facto discriminatory if it merely imposes conditions that all 
countries are equally capable of fulfilling or are even required to 
fulfill.182 For instance, the United States might contend that 
conditioning GSP beneficiary status on fundamental labor standards 
recognized by the ILO183 is not discriminatory because all WTO 
members have committed themselves to these fundamental 
standards.184 
Hence, developed countries might argue that the crux of the de 
facto discriminatory inquiry should be whether all countries are 
equally situated to comply with a provision. The factual limitations of 
Canada—Autos—the complete inability of some manufacturers to 
comply with the origin-neutral condition—make it difficult to 
anticipate the Appellate Body’s response to this argument. Given the 
strict language of Canada—Autos,185 it is questionable whether the 
Appellate Body would agree with this analysis. If the Appellate Body 
did not agree, a developed country would have to justify 
conditionality in GSP schemes exclusively under the Enabling Clause. 
 
 180. See Lother Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment—Or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921, 922 (2002) 
(“What exactly amounts to an illegal de facto discrimination . . . is unclear and the topic of 
intense debate.”). 
 181. See supra note 176. 
 182. As one scholar puts the question, “In the event that some imports from one Member 
enjoy an advantage under objective, origin-neutral conditions, can another Member always 
claim this advantage for its like exports which do not meet these objective conditions?” Ehring, 
supra note 180, at 930. 
 183. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Bartels, supra note 34, at 524–26 (arguing that a measure imposing standards 
cannot be de facto discriminatory if all countries are bound to such standards, as in the case of 
the ILO fundamental principles); see also WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 4 (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration] (“We renew 
our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards.”), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm; Howse, supra 
note 10, at 1357 (noting that all WTO members are “indirectly” committed to the ILO 
fundamental labor standards through the Singapore Declaration). 
 185. See, e.g., Canada—Autos Appellate Body Report, supra note 174, para. 79 (“The words 
of Article I:1 refer not to . . . like products from some other Members, but to like products 
originating in or destined for ‘all other’ Members.”). 
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2. “Generalized.” In the event that a GSP condition is deemed 
invalid under Article I:1, the developed country nonetheless can 
attempt to justify it under the Enabling Clause. Here, as indicated by 
the Appellate Body, the relevant question is the meaning of 
“generalized” in footnote three; the Appellate Body found that “the 
term ‘generalized’ requires that the GSP schemes of preference-
granting countries remain generally applicable.”186 As such, the term 
manifests the negotiating parties’ intent “to eliminate existing 
‘special’ preferences that were granted only to certain designated 
developing countries.”187 This interpretation of “generalized” 
comports with the negotiating history in UNCTAD II, in that the 
Agreed Conclusions explicitly noted that donor countries would “in 
general” choose beneficiaries on the principle of self-election.188 
That preferences must be “generally applicable” does not 
necessarily preclude donors from imposing conditions on the receipt 
of such preferences. To understand the precise nature of this 
requirement, one must look to the rest of the Enabling Clause—
especially paragraph 3(c)—for context, just as the Appellate Body did 
in interpreting “non-discriminatory.”189 The Appellate Body found 
that paragraph 3(c) authorizes, and indeed requires, developed 
countries to “respond positively” to “development, financial and 
trade needs” assessed according to “an objective standard.”190 Two 
inquiries arise from this conclusion: one, “What is a positive 
response?” and, two, “What are objective standards?” 
The most obvious problem with the U.S. scheme of 
conditionality under the Appellate Body’s analysis is that it might not 
constitute a positive response. Unlike the EC GSP, which offers the 
prospect of additional preferences as an incentive, the U.S. GSP 
removes preferences in the event that a developing country fails to 
meet certain conditions. The Appellate Body defined “positively” as 
“consisting in or characterized by constructive action or attitudes.”191 
According to the Appellate Body, this suggests that actions such as 
conditionality must aim at “improving the development, financial or 
 
 186. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 156. 
 187. Id. para. 155. 
 188. Agreed Conclusions, supra note 29, para. IV.1; see also supra note 31 (explaining the 
principle of self-election). 
 189. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 130. 
 190. Id. paras. 162–63. 
 191. Id. para. 164 (quoting 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2293 (W.R. 
Trumble & A. Stevenson eds., 5th ed. 2002)). 
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trade situation of a beneficiary country,” and that the need in 
question must be one that “can be effectively addressed through tariff 
preferences.”192 Given that the Drug Arrangements constituted 
positive conditionality, the Appellate Body did not consider whether 
negative schemes such as the U.S. GSP could constitute a positive 
response. 
Because the Appellate Body’s analysis with respect to this point 
is underdeveloped, it is impossible to predict whether the United 
States would survive a challenge on this ground. Nevertheless, there 
are plausible arguments that the United States might make in its 
defense. The United States could argue that, in threatening to revoke 
GSP preferences in response to certain conditions, its goal is, in 
effect, to improve the development situation of developing countries. 
It might point to the pervasiveness of negative conditionality in GSP 
schemes as evidence of consensus that negative conditions are 
effective in fueling improvements in developing countries.193 
Assuming that the United States successfully framed its negative 
conditionality as a “positive” response, it also would have to 
demonstrate that such conditions are based on objective criteria. The 
Appellate Body suggested that “[b]road-based recognition of a 
particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral 
instruments adopted by international organizations” might constitute 
such criteria.194 The Appellate Body suggested that “the problem of 
illicit drug production” might constitute a development need,195 but it 
had no occasion to interpret this requirement further because the 
EC’s Drug Arrangements were clearly not based on objective 
criteria.196 
Understanding the objective-criteria requirement necessitates 
further elaboration on what sorts of multilateral instruments reflect 
broad-based recognition. Presumably, institutions to which nearly all 
countries are parties—such as the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, or the World Bank—are sufficiently international in 
scope to qualify under the Appellate Body’s test. There is little in the 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that the subsequent practice 
of parties to a treaty is relevant to the treaty’s meaning. Vienna Convention, supra note 125, art. 
31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. 
 194. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163. 
 195. Id. para. 180. 
 196. Id. paras. 181–83.  
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Appellate Body’s analysis, however, to clarify what institutions 
beyond these clear-cut examples might qualify. For instance, it is 
arguably unfair to hold developing countries to standards adopted by 
organizations such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), to which most developing countries are not 
parties. 
Footnote three of the Enabling Clause proves instrumental in 
elucidating the objective-criteria requirement. The footnote requires 
that GSP schemes be “[a]s described” in the 1971 waiver,197 which 
describes preferences not only as “generalized, non-reciprocal, and 
non-discriminatory” but also as “mutually acceptable.”198 Thus, it 
appears that all elements of GSP schemes, including conditionality, 
must be “mutually acceptable” to both developed and developing 
countries. In the case of standards developed by international 
organizations to which the objecting developing countries are not 
parties, such as the OECD, conditions based on such standards would 
not be “mutually acceptable” and should be invalid. 
Importantly, the 1971 waiver refers to “mutually acceptable,” not 
“mutually accepted,” preferences. Thus, developing countries need 
not have explicitly agreed to a certain condition in the context of a 
GSP scheme;199 the condition need only be acceptable—that is, 
“capable or worthy of being accepted”200 by developing countries. The 
United States might thus contend that, when developing countries 
have agreed to comply with certain standards outside the GSP 
context, the conditioning of GSP preferences on adherence to those 
standards is “mutually acceptable” and would satisfy paragraph 3(c). 
This reasoning might justify certain conditions in the U.S. GSP. 
For example, the United States might justify its labor standards on 
the grounds that developing countries have already committed 
 
 197. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3. 
 198. 1971 Waiver, supra note 34, pmbl. 
 199. The developing countries did agree to one condition in the U.S. GSP in the Agreed 
Conclusions—that preferences would not be extended to countries granting “reverse” 
preferences to other developed countries. See Graham, supra note 22, at 519 (stating that the 
modified U.S. submission to the Special Preferences Committee provided that preferences 
would be withdrawn for countries imposing “reverse” preferences, unless those countries 
assured the United States that they would phase out the reverse preferences); see also 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2462(b)(2)(C) (2000) (codifying this condition). This condition would clearly be “mutually 
acceptable” and should arguably be valid, notwithstanding that it does not “respond positively 
to a development, financial [or] trade need.” EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, 
paras. 162–63. 
 200. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1996). 
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themselves to fundamental labor standards, and that such conditions 
are consequently “acceptable” to developing countries.201 
Conditioning GSP benefits on combating terrorism also might be 
legitimate because there exist numerous treaties obligating states to 
oppose terrorism.202 Likewise, the United States might plausibly argue 
that conditioning GSP benefits on the provision of compensation for 
nationalized property of U.S. citizens203 is mutually acceptable 
because all countries are committed to this standard under customary 
international law.204 Finally, conditions based on the WTO Agreement 
itself, such as conditions dealing with trade-distorting investment 
measures205 or the failure to protect intellectual property rights,206 
would seem valid under the Appellate Body’s analysis of objective 
standards. In contrast, the United States would be unable to point to 
international instruments requiring developing countries to support 
U.S. efforts to combat terrorism207 or to refrain from Communist 
forms of government;208 these conditions would thus fail the objective-
criteria test. Of course, this step of the analysis is dependent on a 
finding that negative conditionality constitutes a positive response, 
which, as this Note demonstrates, the Appellate Body Report did not 
clarify. 
 
 201. For a discussion of these labor standards in the context of Article I:1, see supra notes 
183–84 and accompanying text. See also WorldTradeLaw.net, Dispute Settlement Commentary 
(DSC): Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries 13, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/ab/ec-
preferences(dsc)(ab).pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(contending that the Appellate Body’s approach permits the imposition of “conditions [that] 
have the potential to be fulfilled,” which include ILO labor standards). 
 202. For a list of such treaties, see U.S. Dep’t of State, International Conventions and Other 
Treaties Relating to Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/6093.htm (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 203. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D). 
 204. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals 
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 475 (1991) (“[I]nternational 
tribunals have repeatedly held that international law requires full compensation for 
expropriations of foreign property.”). Along these lines, conditionality with respect to 
enforcement of arbitral awards could be “mutually acceptable” if the developing country bound 
itself to enforce such awards. See 19 U.S.C.§ 2462(b)(2)(E) (barring beneficiary status for 
countries “fail[ing] to act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards 
in favor of United States citizens”). 
 205. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(6). 
 206. Id. § 2462(c)(5). 
 207. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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3. Other Grounds for Justifying Conditionality. Although the 
primary focus of this analysis is the legitimacy of conditionality under 
Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause, it merits mention that developed 
countries might have other instruments at their disposal to justify the 
imposition of conditions on GSP benefits. First, other WTO 
provisions might justify conditionality or discrimination in GSP 
schemes. It is clear that developed countries could obtain waivers for 
preferential schemes that would otherwise violate Article I:1 and the 
Enabling Clause.209 In fact, with respect to the EC’s Drug 
Arrangements, the Panel noted that a waiver would bring the EC into 
compliance with its GATT obligations.210 It is also possible—though 
less certain—that a developed country could justify conditionality or 
discrimination in a GSP scheme through other exceptions to Article 
I:1. For example, the EC originally asserted as a defense GATT 
Article XX, which permits deviations from Article I:1 to protect 
human life or health.211 Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body 
discussed the extent to which Article XX could excuse GSP schemes 
that were inconsistent with the Enabling Clause. If Article XX can 
justify discriminating among all countries, however, it potentially 
justifies discriminating among a subset of those countries (i.e., 
developing countries). 
A second, more complicated possibility is that a separate legal 
instrument negotiated outside the WTO framework could authorize 
conditionality within the context of the GSP. Suppose, for instance, 
that the United States concluded a trade agreement with a developing 
country in which the developing country agreed that GSP preferences 
would be revoked if it failed to adhere to certain criteria. Naturally, 
the United States would argue that this agreement precluded the 
developing country from challenging the legitimacy of such 
conditionality within the WTO framework. The extent to which non-
WTO law may be invoked successfully to defend a violation of a 
WTO provision is unresolved.212 This Note does not examine the 
 
 209. See GATT art. XXV:5 (permitting GATT members to waive the GATT obligations of 
member countries “in exceptional circumstances” by a two-thirds vote); see, e.g., Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act—Renewal of Waiver, supra note 65 (authorizing differential 
treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act until December 31, 2005). 
 210. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 8.3. 
 211. Id. para. 4.91.  
 212. See Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-
World Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 997, 
997–98 (2003) (noting that, although Panels and the Appellate Body have often referred to non-
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issues underlying the debate but merely posits this as a potential basis 
for justifying conditionality under the GSP. 
C. Graduation: A Legitimate Response to “Development Needs” 
Although the Appellate Body explicitly noted that it was not 
ruling on the legitimacy of “the EC’s mechanisms for the graduation 
of developing countries,”213 its analysis of the Drug Arrangements 
nonetheless intimated that graduation mechanisms are permissible as 
a general matter. In its discussion of the “development, financial and 
trade needs” of developing countries, the Appellate Body looked to 
paragraph seven of the Enabling Clause, which confirms the 
expectation that the beneficiary countries’ “capacity to make 
contributions or concessions under the GATT will ‘improve with the 
progressive development of their economies.’”214 In recognizing that 
development will not occur “in lockstep” for all beneficiaries, the 
Appellate Body suggested that the Enabling Clause permits the 
graduation of high-performing countries.215 
Of course, that graduation is likely permissible as a general 
matter does not signify that any and all graduation schemes are valid. 
Any measure taken under the Enabling Clause must comport with 
paragraph 3(c), requiring developed countries to “respond positively 
to the development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countries.”216 Given that such needs must be evaluated on the basis of 
objective criteria,217 the decision to graduate a country from the GSP 
because it no longer has development needs should also be based on 
objective criteria. The Appellate Body provides as examples of such 
 
WTO law when interpreting terms in WTO agreements, they have not determined when non-
WTO law might constitute a defense to a violation of WTO provisions). See generally JOOST 
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (concluding that a defendant 
should be able to invoke non-WTO norms as defenses to WTO violations); John O. McGinnis, 
The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The 
Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 231 (2003) (arguing that customary international 
law should not trump WTO and other multilateral agreements); Pauwelyn, supra, at 1019–28 
(proposing four situations in which non-WTO law might prevail over WTO law). 
 213. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, paras. 128–29. 
 214. Id. para. 160 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 7). 
 215. Id. para. 161. 
 216. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c).  
 217. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163. 
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objective criteria “the WTO Agreement or . . . multilateral 
instruments adopted by international organizations.”218 
The U.S. graduation mechanism, which relies on the World 
Bank’s designation of countries as “‘high income’ countr[ies],”219 is, 
quite plausibly, based on such objective criteria. Although this 
designation is not formally adopted by World Bank members, the 
international community widely recognizes it as a development 
benchmark.220 More importantly, nearly all WTO members are also 
members of the World Bank. Consequently, World Bank 
classifications should qualify as objective criteria, and the U.S. 
graduation mechanism should be valid under the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the developed countries technically lost round one in a 
possible long-term fight over GSP schemes, many aspects of the 
Appellate Body Report favor developed countries, particularly in 
comparison to the overly strict Panel Report.221 The Appellate Body’s 
emphasis on responding to objectively determined development 
needs leaves open the possibility that some differentiation in GSP 
schemes is consistent with the Enabling Clause. Nonetheless, the 
report opens the door for developing countries to challenge regional 
differentiation, conditionality, and graduation not based on “[b]road-
based recognition of a particular development need.”222 The 
Appellate Body did little to clarify what such broad-based recognition 
might entail. This Note argues that the Appellate Body should rely on 
the “mutually acceptable” language in the 1971 waiver to limit 
development needs to those about which developing countries have 
agreed in some international context. Otherwise, the question of what 
constitutes a development need could be left to the discretion of the 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (2000) (“graduating” countries that the World Bank has 
designated as “high income” countries). 
 220. For example, the EC’s graduation mechanism also incorporates the World Bank 
standards. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3.1, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 2 (“A 
beneficiary country shall be removed from Annex I where . . . the country is classified by the 
World Bank as a high-income country . . . .”). 
 221. See supra note 132 (reporting the EC’s positive response to the Appellate Body 
Report). 
 222. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163. 
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Appellate Body, threatening to undermine developed- and 
developing-country efforts to identify joint development priorities. 
In the context of the U.S. GSP, this analysis signifies that 
regional differentiation is probably illegitimate but that graduation is 
quite probably legitimate. The murkiest question is whether the 
United States may condition the receipt of GSP preferences 
altogether. Both Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause might sustain 
some—but not all—conditions in the U.S. scheme, depending on how 
the Appellate Body would resolve certain key issues. Although the 
Appellate Body Report has no formal consequences for the U.S. 
GSP, the U.S. scheme is vulnerable to future challenges from 
developing countries that, like India, are dissatisfied with their 
current place in the international trading system. 
